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Double Counter
Security incident report · INC-2026-10-04

Targeted attack on Double Counter’s infrastructure

Published 5 October 2026 · Updated 21 October 2026 · All times UTC

Status: contained, service restored

The attacker’s last action in our cloud infrastructure was recorded at 17:54 on 4 October. A full audit found no backdoor left behind. Double Counter was restored at 19:19 with new credentials and is under continuous monitoring.

Summary

On 4 October 2026, Double Counter was the target of a deliberate, multi-stage attack. The attacker broke into a server from our previous hosting setup through a vulnerability in an analytics tool it was still running, then used credentials found on that server to reach our cloud infrastructure and adapted to each of our containment steps. During the attack they took control of the bot’s Discord token, used it to post links to their own Discord server in about 50 large servers, copied part of one of our databases, and used stolen payment keys to read customer billing records and to commit financial fraud on a separate account.

We cut off their access, found no persistence, replaced the exposed credentials and restored the service at 19:19. We sincerely apologise to everyone affected.

  • 5 h 51 min of attacker activity in our cloud (12:03 → 17:54).
  • About 12 GB copied from one of our databases (15:09 → 15:34).
  • About 50 large servers where the bot posted the attacker’s links.
  • $7,331 charged fraudulently to saved cards on a separate payment account (Atis); $7,322 refunded the same day.

How the attack unfolded

  1. 1

    Initial access

    The entry point was an old server from our previous OVH hosting setup. It was no longer in use and no longer linked to the operational Double Counter service. The attacker probed our services and that server from rotating VPN addresses starting on 3 October at 05:28, then worked methodically through a list of usernames — root, nathan, debian, and service names such as analytics-sync and metabase — before logging in at 00:47 on 4 October; the login took only a few tries once they reached the right account. The way in was a self-hosted analytics tool (Metabase) that was still running, and publicly reachable, on that retired server: a vulnerability in it let the attacker forge an administrator session and, through it, reach the host and the credentials used to log in — not a password leaked from our source code. The server held two credentials for our cloud: the key of a service account (a non-human identity our services use to talk to the cloud, here with administrator rights) and an administrator’s saved command-line session. The attacker created no new account; they used these two existing, legitimate credentials, which is part of why their activity initially blended in.

  2. 2

    Entry into the cloud (12:03)

    With the service-account key, the attacker added their own SSH key to the project (12:08) and exported one of our databases into a storage bucket they created (12:19–12:35). That export was never downloaded.

  3. 3

    Control of the Discord bot (12:26)

    They opened a shell inside a running bot container and read the bot token. On our support server they used it to give their account Administrator rights (13:24) and to unban it after our staff banned it (13:33), and from 13:30 they used it to post links to their own Discord server in about 50 large servers that use Double Counter.

  4. 4

    Adapting to our response (14:46–15:34)

    When we set a new bot token, they read it within two minutes. They then deleted backups they had created, changed the database administrator password to lock our services out (15:09), and started copying the databases they could find from a cloud-hosted machine until we located and terminated their session (15:34).

  5. 5

    Fallback credential (15:54–17:54)

    When we revoked the service-account key, they switched to the administrator session taken from the same server, re-added their SSH key and connected to the database again, without any measurable data transfer. All sessions of that account were revoked at about 17:55.

Timeline

Times marked ≈ are accurate to within a few minutes; all others come from system logs.

TimeTypeEvent
Friday 3 October
05:28AttackerFirst probing of our services, then of the legacy server and its publicly reachable analytics tool, from rotating VPN addresses.
Saturday 4 October
00:47AttackerLogin to the legacy OVH server through a vulnerability in an analytics tool running on it, after working through a list of usernames.
12:03AttackerFirst use of the service-account key in our cloud.
12:08AttackerSSH key added to the cloud project.
12:19–12:35AttackerDatabase export to a bucket they created. Never downloaded.
12:26AttackerShell in a bot container. Bot token obtained.
13:24–13:34AttackerSupport server: Administrator granted by the bot (13:24), about 15 roles (13:26), staff ban (13:32), bot unban (13:33), ban again (13:34).
13:30AttackerThe bot begins posting links to the attacker’s server in large servers.
13:39ResponseThe bot token is invalidated. The bot goes offline and the attacker loses control of it.
≈14:45ResponseNew bot token installed; verifications resume by 14:49.
14:46–14:51AttackerNew shells in containers. New token exposed.
14:57ResponseReal-time monitoring of every permission the bot grants goes live.
15:04–15:09AttackerBackups deleted, database administrator password changed. Verifications stop.
15:09–15:34AttackerDatabase tables copied (about 12 GB).
15:17ResponseIntrusion identified in the cloud audit logs.
15:20ResponseService-account key disabled; database protected against deletion.
15:21ResponseAttacker’s SSH key removed from the project.
15:24ResponseDatabase closed to the internet.
15:28ResponseNew database password set; verifications resume.
≈15:34ResponseAttacker’s database-copy session located and terminated.
15:36ResponseStolen key deleted; its service account disabled and stripped of all rights.
15:54–16:46AttackerFallback to the administrator session: container shells, database connection.
≈16:08ResponseDouble Counter taken offline deliberately to cut off the fallback access.
≈16:19ResponseBot token reset and moved to our secret store.
16:25–16:52ResponseCache database migrated off the public internet onto a private network in our cloud.
17:03–17:13AttackerUsing a stolen payment key, charges the saved cards of 11 customers of a separate (Atis) payment account.
17:14ResponseThe abused payment key is revoked; the fraudulent charges stop.
17:33–17:54AttackerSSH key re-added, then five database connections. Last recorded action at 17:54:57.
≈17:55ResponseAll sessions of the administrator account revoked. The attacker’s cloud access ends.
≈18:00ResponseLegacy OVH server shut down.
18:00–18:40ResponseBackdoor audit of 14 cloud projects: nothing found. Database password replaced again (18:15).
≈18:35AttackerInvitations posted in our support server through two webhooks.
≈18:40ResponseAll ten exposed Discord webhooks deleted.
19:11–19:12ResponseLogging of every secret read enabled; alerting on sensitive cloud changes armed.
≈19:14–19:16ResponseAll session-signing keys replaced; bot token reset a final time.
19:19ResponseDouble Counter restored with new credentials.
19:40ResponseNew Discord webhooks put into service, their addresses held only in our secret store.
21:28–21:35ResponseAll payment-provider keys replaced.
≈21:53ResponseFraudulent charges refunded.

Personal data affected

The copy tool works through that database in a fixed order, so by comparing the ≈12 GB that left with the size of each table we can assess what was copied. The figures below cover personal data, including, for completeness, data held outside that database. Counts are approximate.

DataRecordsStatus
Discord user IDs and usernames of affected accounts≈ 28 M accountsPartly copied (treated as exposed)
IP addresses and coarse geolocation (country, region, city, postal code, ISP)≈ 27 M accountsPartly copied (treated as exposed)
User-agent hash: a one-way hash of the browser’s user agent, city and country, used for alt detection≈ 25 M accountsCopied
Email addresses (de-duplicated): Doogle accounts (≈ 840k), Double Counter dashboard, server-manager, customer and advertiser contacts (≈ 240k)≈ 1.0 M accountsCopied
VPN detection logs (IP addresses and user agents)≈ 15 MNot copied
Full export of the affected database, created at 12:355.0 GBNot downloaded
Payment-provider customer records (Doogle and Atis): name, email address, Discord ID and username, billing address, plan and payment history, card brand, expiry date and last four digits≈ 5,000 customersCopied, partly published

The IP-address records sit in two tables. The first (alt detection, ≈5.4 M) was copied in full. The second (verified users, ≈21.7 M) was being copied when we ended the session: from the volume transferred we estimate that about 20% had left, and because we cannot tell which rows, we treat the whole set as exposed.

Not affected: Discord passwords, which Double Counter never receives, and full card numbers and security codes, which only our payment provider holds and which were never accessible. The payment account that processes Double Counter and Doogle subscriptions shows no unauthorised charges; the payment fraud described below hit a separate account.

Payment fraud

Among the secrets the attacker could read in our cloud was the payment-provider (Stripe) key of a separate Tellter product, Atis. They used it to commit financial fraud on that account on 4 October, between 17:03 and 17:13:

  • 40 charges of escalating amounts ($1, $10, $100, $1,000, then $10,000) against the cards saved by 11 existing customers of that product, one of them a company card of ours.
  • 23 charges went through, for $7,331; 17 were declined. $7,322 was refunded the same day, and the remaining $9, charged to three customers, has since been refunded.

We revoked the abused key at 17:14 and replaced every payment-provider key that evening. With the stolen keys, the attacker could also read the customer records of the payment account used for Doogle and Double Counter subscriptions (name, email and billing address, plan, card brand, expiry date and last four digits); no charge was made on that account. No full card numbers were exposed: the payment provider holds those, and the attacker acted through the account, not the card data.

Impact on Discord servers

  • Links to the attacker’s server. The bot posted invitations to the attacker’s Discord server in about 50 large servers that use Double Counter, based on the reports we have received. These messages appeared as sent by Double Counter. The largest server targeted was “Steal a brainrot”. Substantially all of these messages have been deleted, by us or by each server’s moderation team. We are not linking to the attacker’s server here.
  • Our support server. Administrator rights and about fifteen roles granted to the attacker’s account (Discord ID 931487207443804161), one unban, and invitations posted through two webhooks.

Messages sent with the stolen token went straight to Discord without passing through our systems, so we identified the affected servers from the reports we received and from the bot’s own message history.

What we have done

Cut off the attacker

  • Disabled, then deleted, the stolen service-account key, and stripped its account of every right.
  • Revoked all sessions of the administrator account whose saved login was on the server.
  • Removed the attacker’s SSH key, shut down the legacy OVH server, and removed its access to our source code.
  • Reset the bot token and deleted all ten Discord webhooks whose addresses could have been exposed.

Closed the ways in

  • Closed the affected database to the internet: it now accepts only authenticated connections from our own services.
  • Migrated the cache database off the third-party, internet-facing host it used onto a private network inside our own cloud, with no public address.
  • Disabled the over-privileged service account. No long-lived service-account key remains in our cloud project.

Rotated our secrets

  • Replaced the credentials the attacker could have read: the bot token, the database and cache passwords, every session-signing key (which signed everyone out), our payment-provider keys and webhook secrets, our Discord application secrets and our AI provider keys. The keys of our remaining third-party providers are being rotated.
  • Signed every staff member out of our internal staff panel and started resetting staff credentials.
  • The bot token and the Discord webhooks now live in a dedicated secret store, never in our code.

Verified and watched

  • Audited 14 cloud projects for persistence: no key, account, permission, machine, scheduled job or container image was left behind by the attacker.
  • Turned on logging of every read of our stored secrets and real-time monitoring of the permissions the bot grants, with continuous monitoring since the service was restored.

Informed the people affected

  • Since 21 October 2026, we are emailing everyone whose email address was in the affected data (about 1 million people), and separately the Doogle customers whose billing records were exposed.
  • Requested the removal of the copies of the data published online.

What you should do

Server administrators

  • Delete any message sent by Double Counter on 4 October between 12:00 and 16:30 UTC that invites people to another server.
  • Check your audit log for actions by Double Counter in that window.

Members

  • Nothing to change on your Discord account.
  • Don’t join servers advertised in unexpected messages from Double Counter.
  • If you verified between 13:39 and 14:49 UTC without getting your role, verify again.

Doogle, Atis, advertiser and API customers

  • Doogle users, advertisers and API customers: your email address was exposed, so expect phishing attempts.
  • Doogle customers: your billing details (name, billing address, plan, card brand, expiry date and last four digits) were exposed, but not your full card number. Be wary of fake payment or refund messages.
  • Atis customers: the attacker charged the saved cards of 11 customers on 4 October. $7,322 was refunded the same day and the remaining $9 since; we are contacting each of them.
  • We never ask for passwords, tokens or payment by email or private message.

Legal and notifications

  • We notified the French data protection authority (CNIL) on 5 October 2026, under reference FR2610050000001.
  • We have engaged legal counsel and are pursuing those responsible in both France and the United States. A criminal complaint was filed with the Paris public prosecutor on 21 October 2026, built on platform and Discord logs, direct-message screenshots, and technical indicators collected from our own systems.
  • Since 21 October 2026, we are notifying the people concerned by email, as required by the GDPR.

Contact

For questions or personal-data requests, write to [email protected], use the bot’s /privacy command, or reach us on our support server. We will update this page when the investigation concludes.

INC-2026-10-04 · Version 2.0 · Last updated 21 October 2026 · Tellter SAS, operator of Double Counter. This report reflects what we know at the time of writing and will be updated as the investigation progresses. Version 2.0 corrects the payment-fraud figures from our payment provider’s records and adds the exposed billing records, the criminal complaint and the notifications under way; version 1.9 was published on 5 October 2026.